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Abstract
This paper deals with a constrained investment problem for a dened contribution (DC)
pension fund where retirees are allowed to defer the purchase of the annuity at some future time
after retirement.
This problem has already been treated in the unconstrained case in a number of papers.
The aim of this work is to deal with the more realistic case when constraints on the investment
strategies and on the state variable are present. Due to the diculty of the task, we consider, as
a rst step, the basic model of [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004], where interim consumption
and annuitization time are xed. We extend their model by adding a no short-selling constraint
on the control variable and a nal capital requirement constraint on the state variable. This
implies, in particular, no ruin.
The mathematical problem is naturally formulated as a stochastic control problem with con-
straints on the control and the state variable, and is approached by the dynamic programming
method. We write the non-linear Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation for the problem and trans-
form it into a dual one that is semi-linear, following a well-established duality procedure. In
the special relevant case without running cost, we explicitly compute the value function for the
problem and give the optimal strategy in feedback form. A numerical application ends the paper
and shows the extent of applicability of the model to a DC pension fund in the decumulation
phase.
J.E.L. classication: C61, G11, G23.
A.M.S. classication: 91B28, 93E20, 49L25.
Keywords: pension fund, decumulation phase, constrained portfolio, stochastic optimal con-
trol, dynamic programming, Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation.
Acknowledgements: We thank three anonymous reviewers for thorough reading and the
editor for careful handling of the paper.
Dipartimento di Economia e Giurisprudenza, Universita degli studi di Cassino e del Lazio Meridionale, Italy.
Email: digiacinto at unicas.it.
yDipartimento di Economia, Management e Metodi Quantitativi, Universita' di Milano, Via Conservatorio 7,
20122 Milano. Email: salvatore.federico at unimi.it.
zDipartimento di Scienze Economiche ed Aziendali, Luiss University, Roma, Italy & Centro De Giorgi, Scuola
Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy. Email: fgozzi at luiss.it.
xUniversita di Torino, Collegio Carlo Alberto and CeRP, Italy. Email: elena.vigna at unito.it.
1
1 Introduction
In countries where immediate annuitization is the only option available in dened contribution (DC)
pension schemes, members who retire at a time of low bond yield rates have to accept a pension
lower than the one available with higher bond yields (so-called annuity risk). In many countries,
including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Denmark, El Salvador, Japan, Peru, UK,
US, the retiree is allowed to defer annuitization until some time after retirement, withdraw periodic
income from the fund, and invest the rest of it in the period between retirement and annuitization.
This allows the retiree to postpone the decision to purchase an annuity until a more propitious time.
This exibility is usually referred to as \income drawdown option" or \programmed withdrawal
(option)".1 For a detailed survey on the several forms of benets provided by the programmed
withdrawals option, we refer the interested reader to [Antolin, Pugh & Stewart, 2008]. There are
often limits imposed on both the consumption and on how long the annuity purchase can be
deferred. On the other hand, there is virtually unlimited freedom to invest the fund in a broad
range of assets. While this option allows the retiree to aim for a nal annuity higher than that pur-
chasable at retirement, the evident drawback consists in the possibility of ruin, i.e. exhausting the
fund while still alive. The three degrees of freedom of the retiree (amount of consumption, invest-
ment allocation, and time of annuitization), together with the important issue of ruin possibility,
have been investigated in the actuarial and nancial literature in many papers. Among others we
recall [Albrecht & Maurer, 2002], [Blake, Cairns & Dowd, 2003], [Di Giacinto & Vigna, 2012],
[Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2006], [Gerrard, Hjgaard & Vigna, 2012] [Milevsky, 2001],
[Milevsky, Moore & Young, 2006], [Milevsky & Young, 2007].
While the issue of ruin has been tackled in many papers, the problem of providing a minimum
guarantee to the pensioner who takes the income drawdown option has not been considered in
the literature, up to our knowledge. Nevertheless, the guarantee of a minimum level of ultimate
annuity should be strong reason for taking programmed withdrawals. Moreover, the introduction of
restrictions { which is more consistent with the nancial regulatory environment { makes possible
a more accurate judgement on the eective tradeo between the risks and the benets provided
by the income drawdown option. Motivated by these considerations, in this paper we ll in this
gap in the literature, by dening and solving an optimal investment problem for the decumulation
phase of a DC plan, where a minimum guarantee is provided and short-selling is forbidden.
The natural way of dealing with this problem is to formulate it as a stochastic optimal con-
trol problem with an appropriate choice of the state and control variables, of the constraints
that they must satisfy, and of the optimizing criterion (utility or loss function). We choose
the framework of [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004], [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2006], and
[Gerrard, Hjgaard & Vigna, 2012] taking a quadratic target-based loss function. Indeed our ap-
proach could be used also to treat dierent objective functions. The three mentioned works consider
similar models with an increasing number of degrees of freedom (i.e. control variables) but they
do not solve the problems when constraints on the wealth and on the investment strategies are
present.2 Since the introduction of these constraints makes the problem very hard to attack and
non treatable in the general case with the results of the known literature, we consider the simplest
model [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004], where the retiree is given only one degree of freedom,
1Other equivalent expressions are: phased withdrawal, scheduled withdrawal, allocated annuities, allocated pen-
sions, allocated income streams.
2In [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004], the only control variable is the investment strategy, in
[Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2006] the control variables are the investment and the consumption policies, while
in [Gerrard, Hjgaard & Vigna, 2012] the retiree is allowed to choose the annuitization time, together with the
investment-consumption policies.
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namely the investment allocation. The income withdrawn from the fund in the unit time is assumed
to be xed and the retiree is obliged to annuitize at a xed future time T . In view of this fact, this
paper must be considered as a rst step towards a satisfactory treatment of the problem.
From the methodological point of view, following the approach of the papers mentioned above,
we tackle the problem by the dynamic programming approach studying the associated Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation.
Notice that other methods can be used to deal with the same problem. In particular,
in the case of optimal portfolio problems with capital constraints, both probabilistic dual-
ity methods and methods based on backward stochastic dierential equations (BSDE) have
been successfully employed in the literature. In this respect we observe that, among others,
[Basak & Shapiro, 2001], [El Karoui, Jeanblanc & Lacoste, 2005], [Korn, 1997], [Tepla, 2001], and
[Bielecki, Jin, Pliska & Zhou, 2005] are concerned with this kind of problem. More precisely,
[Basak & Shapiro, 2001], [Korn, 1997] and [Tepla, 2001] deal with direct duality methods on the
control problem - while we use duality at an analytic stage applying it to the HJB equation. How-
ever, dierently from our case, in [Korn, 1997] the constraint is on the nal average of the wealth,
while in [Basak & Shapiro, 2001] there is a VaR-type constraint. The paper closest to ours seems
to be [Tepla, 2001], where, as in our case, an almost sure constraint on the terminal wealth is
imposed. What we get is from a purely analytic point of view the same result as in [Tepla, 2001].
Moreover, we should mention also the link of our problem with the rich class of mean-variance
(MV) optimization problems in continuous-time. The well-known equivalence between MV-
problems and expected utility maximization problems with quadratic utility function in the single-
period framework can be extended to the continuous-time case (see for instance [Korn, 1997],
[Zhou & Li, 2000], [Bielecki, Jin, Pliska & Zhou, 2005], [Vigna, 2013]). In the rich stream of lit-
erature on MV-optimization originating by the seminal paper [Zhou & Li, 2000], the work by
[Bielecki, Jin, Pliska & Zhou, 2005] solve a problem similar to ours, in a more general setting re-
garding the nancial market. Their methodology is an extension of the risk neutral approach
introduced by [Pliska, 1986] and boils down in presenting the optimal portfolio as the solution
of a linear backward stochastic dierential equation (BSDE). Related work can be found in
[Lim & Zhou, 2002], who also use BSDEs to solve a mean-variance portfolio selection problem
with random interest rate, appreciation rates and volatility coecients. We mention also the paper
[Fu, Lari-Lavassani & Li, 2010] dealing with a MV portfolio selection problem with a borrowing
constraint given by the presence of dierent interest rates for borrowing and lending.
If one chooses to deal with a dynamic programming approach - as we do - it turns out that the pres-
ence of a state constraint leads to suitable boundary conditions for the HJB equation bringing a loss
of the possibility of nding, unlike the papers mentioned above, simple explicit solutions to such an
equation. Also a straight theoretical approach to the HJB equation { dealing, for instance, with a
characterization of the value function as the unique viscosity solution and then with the proof of the
regularity of viscosity solutions { is very problematic, since the HJB equation is a fully nonlinear, de-
generate, non autonomous parabolic PDE. Therefore, we use a known procedure from portfolio opti-
mization, which allows us to transform the original equation into a nicer looking dual one. This pro-
cedure has been used, e.g., in [Elie & Touzi, 2008], [Gao, 2008], [Gerrard, Hjgaard & Vigna, 2012],
[Milevsky, Moore & Young, 2006], [Milevsky & Young, 2007] and [Xiao , Zhai & Qin, 2007]. In all
such papers the dual equation is always linear.3
3To this regard, it is worth to stress that in [Schwartz & Tebaldi, 2006] this procedure is applied in an incomplete
market (due to the presence of an uninsurable income) giving rise to a dual equation which is still fully nonlinear.
The authors approach this dual equation by means of a series expansion.
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In our case the dual equation is in general semilinear and becomes linear when the current
cost is zero. The general semilinear case is studied in the extended version of this paper
[Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010] (to which the interested reader is referred) proving
regularity of solutions to the dual equation and, consequently, to the original one. In this paper,
for brevity, we set up the general model and then focus on the special and still signicant case with
no running cost, which allows, with a procedure similar to the above quoted papers, to nd an
explicit solution to the dual problem and come back with an explicit solution to the original one.
So we can characterize the optimal strategy and wealth and perform a numerical simulation which
allows to get some insights on the eects of the constraints on the optimal paths.
The availability of closed-form solutions to this problem is particularly important in the context of
DC pension schemes. Indeed, using this model the retiree who takes the income drawdown option
can decide about both the level of the minimum guarantee and that of a desired target. These levels
are driven by the retiree's risk prole, the determination of which is typically an issue. Application
of closed-form optimal policies coupled with numerical simulations for the risky asset provide the
distribution of the annuity received upon ultimate annuitization, which helps the retiree determine
her own risk prole. All these features make this model { or possible evolutions of it { applicable by
pension fund advisors in the decision-making process of retirees entering the decumulation phase
of a DC scheme.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model and
dene the problem to be solved. Section 3 represents the theoretical core of the paper. Therein,
we consider the problem, pass to the dual formulation, and show equivalence between the dual and
the original problem. We then nd closed-form solutions for the special case with no running cost.
In Section 4, we show a numerical application that highlights the potential applicability to a DC
pension plan. Section 5 concludes and outlines further research.
2 The model
In this section, we outline the model and describe the problem faced by a representative member
of a pension scheme.
We consider the position of an individual who chooses the income drawdown option at retire-
ment. We assume that nal annuitization is compulsory at a certain age. Thus, the individual
withdraws a certain xed income until she achieves the age when the purchase of the annuity
is compulsory. Without loss of generality, we assume that the individual retires at time s = 0
and that compulsory annuitization occurs at time s = T . In a real context the pensioner could
annuitize at any time between s = 0 and s = T . Here, for mathematical convenience and as
in [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004], we assume that the pensioner annuitizes exactly at time
T . Introducing the possibility of choosing the annuitization time would increase the diculty of
the problem substantially. The problem of nding the optimal investment-consumption couple as
well as optimal annuitization time has been treated rigorously as a combined stochastic control
and optimal stopping problem in [Milevsky, Moore & Young, 2006], [Milevsky & Young, 2007] and
[Gerrard, Hjgaard & Vigna, 2012]. However, none of these papers treats the case with constraints
on the investment strategy and the state variable.
The fund is invested in two assets: a riskless asset with constant instantaneous rate of return r  0,
and a risky asset whose price follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant volatility  > 0
and drift  := r + , where  > 0 is the so-called Sharpe ratio or risk premium. The random
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variable TD representing the remaining lifetime of the pensioner is assumed to be exponentially
distributed with parameter  > 0, and is assumed to be independent of the Brownian motion.
The pensioner withdraws a xed amount b0 > 0 in the unit of time. Bequest motives are absent
and the only reason for deferred annuitization and programmed withdrawals is the hope that they
leave the investor better o. Indeed, the basic idea driving this option (see also [Milevsky, 2001])
is that, since the annuity price is calculated with the riskfree rate, in the years after retirement
the equity risk premium pays more than the mortality credits (due to annuitants who die earlier
than average). To support this intuition, [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2006] have also found that
in the presence of suciently good risky assets the income drawdown option should be preferred
to immediate annuitization. The choice of a xed consumption rate throughout the decumulation
phase, made mainly for mathematical convenience, is consistent with the hope of being better o
with deferred annuitization. In fact, by selecting b0 equal to the pension rate produced by immediate
annuitization, the comparison between immediate annuitization and programmed withdrawals is
then straightforward, the former producing a xed income of b0 until death, the latter producing
an income of b0 until time T and a dierent (hopefully higher) pension rate from T until death.
According to [Merton, 1969] the state equation that describes the dynamics of the fund wealth X()
is the following(
dX(s) = [rX(s) + (  r)(s)  b0] ds+ (s)dB(s); s 2 [0; T ];
X(0) = x0;
(1)
where x0 > 0 is the fund wealth at the retirement date s = 0, B() is a standard Brownian motion
on the ltered probability space (
;F ;F; P ) where F is the completed ltration generated by B()
and () is the investment strategy representing the amount of portfolio invested in the risky asset.4
We consider the problem where short-selling is not allowed and the nal fund cannot be lower
than a certain pre-determined level S  0. Therefore, S is the minimum guarantee and the set of
admissible strategies is
f()  0 : X(T )  S a.s.g : (2)
As we will show in Proposition 3.1, the nal capital requirement X(T )  S  0 almost surely
implies in particular no ruin, i.e. X(t)  0 almost surely for every t 2 [0; T ].
Almost all works of the literature on optimization problems in DC pension schemes have been solved
without constraints on the control variables and the state variable.5 This is due to the mathematical
diculty of the problem with constraints and justies the choice of simplifying assumptions in this
setup, such as the xed consumption rate and the xed annuitization time. We intend to relax these
assumptions in future work. Given the hard mathematical tractability of this kind of problem, here
we do not tackle the no-borrowing constraint, that is also left to future research.
The preferences of the pensioner are described by the loss function
L(s; x) := (F (s)  x)2 ; (3)
where the target function F (), i.e. the target that the agent wishes to track at any time s 2 [0; T ],
is given by
F (s) :=
b0
r
+

F   b0
r

e r(T s):
4F is the Brownian ltration augmented with the P -null sets, so it satises the usual conditions.
5It is worth to recall the paper [Di Giacinto, Federico & Gozzi, 2011], that solves a constrained portfolio selection
problem in a DC pension scheme, but in a dierent context, adopting the point of view of the fund manager.
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The quantity F 2 (0; b0=r) is the target fund desired at terminal time T and can be chosen
arbitrarily. Then, the interpretation of F (s) is pretty clear. Should the fund hit F (s) at time
s  T , the pensioner would be able to consume b0 from s to T by investing the whole portfolio in
the riskless asset, and achieve the desired target F at time T of compulsory annuitization. Clearly,
in this case the loss function computed on the state trajectory corresponding to this riskless strategy
would be 0 at any time s  t  T . As a matter of fact, it will be shown that if the fund is equal
to the target, the optimal strategy is the null one. Typically, the nal target F as well as the xed
consumption rate b0 will depend on the initial wealth x0 or on the replacement ratio achievable
with it. The quantity F is also associated to the risk prole of the member: a high F is associated
to a less risk averse retiree, and vice versa.
The importance of benchmarks and reference points in decision making was introduced by the
seminal paper on Prospect Theory [Kahneman & Tversky, 1979]. Use of benchmark tracking in
portfolio selection and management can be found in [Gaivoronski, Krylov & van der Wijst, 2005]
and [Lioui & Poncet, 2013]. Similarly, use of reference points in portfolio selection and dependence
of the optimal risky exposure on the reference point is in [He & Zhou, 2011]. Penalty costs and
benchmark targets in pension funds optimization appear in [Geyer & Ziemba, 2008]. In the context
of decision-making in DC schemes recent papers proposing and implementing the use of targets are
[Emms, 2010] and [Blake, Wright, Zhang 2013].
Moreover, the use of targets is particularly important nowadays for pension provision systems,
given the evident switch from dened benet (DB) pension schemes to DC plans occurring in most
industrialized countries. It is well known that, contrary to DB schemes, the pension rate in DC
plans is not earning-related and the nancial risk is borne by the member. The evident loss in
welfare experienced by members in the passage from DB to DC can be counterbalanced by the
possibility of selecting a target that might make them able to reach the desired replacement ratio
(meant as the ratio between pension rate and last salary). This is made possible by the present
model that incorporates the selection of a target F . The only selection of the safety level S does
not provide the member with this possibility, because S must be intended as a oor capital, and
cannot be chosen too big for the restrictions imposed in the paper. Given the appropriateness of
targets in the model, a natural candidate for a proper utility function is the quadratic loss function
such as the one in (3).
It is important to underline at this stage the fundamental dierence between S and F . Clearly,
S < F . While the latter is the target desired by the pensioner, the former is the minimum wealth
guaranteed by the pension fund at time T . In other words, S is guaranteed, F is not. In real
applications, the selection of both S and F should be made by the retiree and should reect her
risk attitude. Intuitively, the lower the gap between them, the higher the risk aversion, and vice
versa. Notice that, while the presence of a minimum guarantee S is not new in the literature
on portfolio selection of a DC pension plan (see, for example, [Deelstra, Grasselli & Koehl, 2003]),
the coexistence of both a safety level S and a target F is a novelty for DC schemes, up to our
knowledge. Note that the inclusion of F and S in the model make the problem dicult to be
solved from the mathematical point of view, so, to solve it, we need to pass to a dual problem
that will be introduced in Section 3.4.1. A relevant example of the use of safety level and targets
in an insurance context is provided by [Browne, 1995], who derives optimal investment policies by
minimizing the probability that the wealth hits a certain bottom level (safety level) before hitting
a certain upper level (target).
Notice that minimizing the loss function L(s; x) is equivalent to maximizing the utility function
U(s; x) =   (F (s)  x)2. Thus, this optimization problem is apparently based on the assumption
that there exists a wealth level that maximizes the utility. This drawback is only apparent, since
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we prove that the wealth level F (s) cannot be reached by the fund under optimal control by
construction of the model. Another important implication of this result is the fact that this utility
function in the region of interest is strictly increasing and strictly concave, that are the standard
requirements for a well-behaved utility function (see Remark 3.5).
The choice of this quadratic loss function is also motivated by the fact that, expectedly, it has
been shown to produce an optimal portfolio that is mean-variance ecient (see [Zhou & Li, 2000]
in general, and in the context of DC plans [Vigna, 2013]). Indeed, there is no other portfolio that
provides a (strictly) higher expected value with the same variance, and no other portfolio that
provides a (strictly) lower variance with the same mean. Although mean-variance is not the only
criterion available for decision-making in pension funds, we regard it as appropriate for a vari-
ety of reasons, including the fact that it is still one of the most common criteria used to assess
and compare funds performances (see [Chiu & Zhou, 2011]). The optimization of quadratic loss
functions is not new in the literature on pension funds: in the context of dened benet pension
funds [Josa-Fombellida & Rincon-Zapatero, 2008], [Josa-Fombellida & Rincon-Zapatero, 2010] and
[Josa-Fombellida & Rincon-Zapatero, 2012] minimize quadratic loss functions corresponding to sol-
vency risk and contribution risk.
Furthermore, this choice of the target function has several advantages.
Firstly, as noted above, the interpretation of F (s) is pretty clear.
Secondly, as mentioned above, the possibility that deviations above the target can produce unrea-
sonable positive loss is prevented. [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004] show that the optimal fund
never reaches the target, provided that at initial time s = 0 the fund x0 is lower than the target
F (0); the same holds true in our constrained context (see Subsection 3.2).
Thirdly, it can be shown that, by choosing a loss function that does not penalize deviations above
the target, such as
~L(s; x) :=

(F (s)  x)2 ; if x  F (s);
0; if x > F (s);
(4)
the optimal policy in the region of interest (i.e. below the target level) is equal to that found with
the loss function (3). This feature is desirable, as stressed in Remark 3.5.
The general optimization problem consists in minimizing over the set of admissible strategies (2)
the functional
E
Z TD
0
e sL(s;X(s))1fsTgds+ e TL(T;X(T ))1fT<TDg

(5)
where  is the subjective discount factor,   0 is a weighting constant which measures the im-
portance of the running cost in the period before annuitization relative to the nal cost at time
T , and TD is the random variable representing the remaining lifetime. When  > 0, the presence
of a running cost keeps the trajectory of the wealth closer to the target at any time t  T , thus
limiting the occurrence of undesirable events { as getting close to the terminal minimum capital
requirement S.
Due to the assumed exponential distribution of TD and its independence from the Brownian motion,
it is easy to show that minimizing the functional (5) is equivalent to minimizing
E
Z T
0
e sL(s;X(s))ds+ e TL(T;X(T ))

; (6)
where  =  + , i.e.  is the sum of the subjective discount factor and the force of mortality.
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3 Solution by Dynamic Programming
We apply the Dynamic Programming technique to approach the problem of minimizing (6). The
rst step consists in writing the problem for generic initial data (t; x). So, given the probability
space (
;F ; P ) and the Brownian motion of the previous section, let us dene for t 2 [0; T ] the
ltration Ft := (F ts)s2[t;T ]; where F ts is the -algebra generated by (B(u) B(t))u2[t;s] and completed
by the P -null sets. Consider the equation(
dX(s) = [rX(s) + (  r)(s)  b0] ds+ (s)dB(s); s 2 [t; T ];
X(t) = x;
where x 2 R and () 2 L2(
  [t; T ];R) is progressively measurable with respect to Ft. This
equation admits a unique strong solution on (
;F ; P ) (see [Karatzas & Shreve, 1998], Section
5.6.C) that we denote by X(; s; x; ()). Let us dene the set of the admissible strategies depending
on the initial (t; x) by
0ad(t; x) :=

() 2 L2(
 [t; T ];R) j () prog. meas. w.r.t. Ft; ()  0; X(T ; t; x; ())  S	:
We are interested in the following optimization problem: for given (t; x) 2 [0; T ] R+,
minimize J(t; x;()) := E
Z T
t
e s (F (s) X(s))2 ds+ e T (F (T ) X(T ))2

(7)
over the set of admissible strategies 0ad(x; t), where we have set X(s) := X(s; t; x; ()) in (7).
We denote the value function associated to this optimization problem by V , i.e.
V (t; x) := inf
()20ad(t;x)
J(t; x;()); t 2 [0; T ]; x 2 R;
with the agreement that inf ; = +1. Clearly we have V  0.
3.1 The set of admissible strategies
Let us set
S(t) :=
b0
r
 

b0
r
  S

e r(T t); t 2 [0; T ]: (8)
The function S() represents a sort of safety level for the wealth. Should the fund hit this barrier
at time t, the null strategy (i.e. ()  0) from t onwards would guarantee the fulllment of the
capital requirement. Moreover, it will be shown that the null strategy is indeed the only admissible
one for x = S(t), and therefore the optimal one. In the next proposition we formalize this intuition.
Proposition 3.1. Let t 2 [0; T ], x 2 R. Then
(1) 0ad(t; x) 6= ; if and only if 0 2 0ad(t; x). This happens if and only if x  S(t).
(2) If x = S(t), then 0ad(t; x) = f0g and X(s; t; x; 0) = S(s) on [t; T ].
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(3) Let x  S(t). Then () 2 0ad(t; x) if and only if
(s) = (s)1fts<g;
where
 := inf fs 2 [t; T ] j X(s; t; x; ()) = S(s)g
with the convention that inf ; = T .
(4) If x > S(t), then 0ad(s; x) ) f0g.
(5) The state constraint X(T )  S is equivalent to
X(t)  S(t); P -a.s. 8t 2 [0; T ]:
Proof. The proof is in the Appendix. 
Proposition 3.1 states some intuitive properties, in particular the fact that the \European
guarantee" X(T )  S is equivalent to the \American guarantee" X(t)  S(t) for all t 2
[0; T ] (see Remark 2.1 in [El Karoui, Jeanblanc & Lacoste, 2005], or also Proposition 2.1 in
[Bielecki, Jin, Pliska & Zhou, 2005]). Hence, the problem makes sense only when the fund lies
above the barrier given by S(t), t 2 [0; T ]. The safety level is an absorbing barrier. As a relevant
consequence, occurrence of ruin { which is one of the major risks implied by programmed with-
drawals { is prevented a priori. Finally, another consequence in the application of the model is that
the subjective choice of the guaranteed nal fund S cannot be too high. In fact, due to (8) and to
x  S(t), it must be
S  xer(T t)   b0
r

er(T t)   1

: (9)
This restriction plays a role in the numerical application (see Remark 4.1).
3.2 Reduction of the problem on a bounded domain
Due to Proposition 3.1, the value function V is nite (and non-negative) on the set
D = f(t; x) 2 [0; T ] R j x  S(t)g:
Due to the specic structure of the target level F () and since we are interested to start from initial
x0 < F (0), we can restrict the problem to a bounded domain. This is due basically to the following
lemma, which shows what happens to the value function and to the optimal strategy when the
fund reaches the target F (t).
Lemma 3.2. Let t 2 [0; T ] and x = F (t). Then X(s; t; x; 0) = F (s) for all s 2 [t; T ]. Moreover,
V (t; x) = 0 and the optimal strategy is ()  0.
Proof. Let t 2 [0; T ], x 2 R, and set X() := X(; t; x; 0). The dynamics of X() are given by(
dX(s) = (rX(s)  b0) ds; s 2 [t; T ];
X(t) = x:
The dynamics of the target F () after t is given by(
dF (s) = (rF (s)  b0) ds; s 2 [t; T ];
F (t) = F (t):
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Therefore X() and F () solve the same initial value problem, so they coincide.
Moreover, since we have J(t; x; 0) = 0 and V (; )  0, we get that ()  0 is optimal for the initial
(t; x) and V (t; x) = 0. 
Lemma 3.2 suggests that the graph of F () works as a barrier for the problem, so that we are led
to consider the region
C = f(t; x) j t 2 [0; T ]; S(t)  x  F (t)g  D: (10)
As a matter of fact we are interested to start from an initial (t; x) 2 C. In this case, the optimal
strategy keeps the state always in C. This is a consequence of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. Let (t; x) 2 C, () 2 0ad(t; x). Set X() := X(; t; x; ()) and dene the
stopping time
 := inf fs  t j X(s) = F (s)g ;
with the convention inf ; = T . Dene the strategy
 (s) :=

(s); if s < ;
0; if s  :
Then J(t; x; ())  J(t; x;()). As a consequence, on C the value function admits the represen-
tation
V (t; x) = inf
()2ad(t;x)
J(t; x;());
where
ad(t; x) =

() 2 0ad(t; x) j S(s)  X(s; t; x; ())  F (s); s 2 [t; T ]
	  0ad(t; x):
Proof. It follows straightly from Lemma 3.2. 
Proposition 3.3 says that on the set C the original problem is equivalent to the problem with state
constraint
S(s)  X(s)  F (s); s 2 [t; T ]:
The analogue of Proposition 3.1 is the following.
Proposition 3.4. Let (t; x) 2 C. Then
(1) 0 2 ad(t; x).
(2) If x = S(t) (respectively, x = F (t)), then ad(t; x) = f0g and X(s; t; x; 0) = S(s) (respec-
tively, X(s; t; x; 0) = F (s)) on [t; T ].
(3) () 2 ad(t; x) if and only if
(s) = (s)1fts<g;
where
 := inf fs 2 [t; T ] j X(s; t; x; ()) 2 fS(s); F (s)gg
with the convention that inf ; = T .
(4) If S(t) < x < F (t), then ad(s; x) ) f0g.
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Proof. The claims can be obtained exactly as in the proof of Proposition 3.1. 
Notice that, rephrasing the problem in these new terms, both the lateral boundaries
@FC := f(t; x) 2 [0; T ] R j x = F (t)g; @SC := f(t; x) 2 [0; T ] R j x = S(t)g
are absorbing for the problem, in the sense that if x = S(t) (respectively, x = F (t)), then the only
admissible strategy is ()  0 and X(s; t; x; 0) = S(s) for s 2 [t; T ] (respectively, X(s; t; x; 0) =
F (s) for s 2 [t; T ]).
Remark 3.5. Two relevant (and connected) consequences of Proposition 3.3 are the following.
1. Starting from (t; x) 2 C (which is the case in our interest), the problem can be written as a
utility maximization problem with an increasing and concave utility function, i.e. as
max
()2ad(t;x)

 
Z T
t
(F (s) X(s))2ds  (F (T ) X(T ))2

;
where x 7!  (F (s)  x)2 is indeed increasing and concave on [S(s); F (s)] for every s 2 [t; T ].
2. If we replace the loss function (3) with (4), i.e. with
~L(s; x) =

(F (s)  x)2 ; if x  F (s);
0; if x > F (s);
(11)
and call ~V the value function associated to such loss function, we have ~V = V on C and,
starting from (t; x) 2 C, we have the same optimal feedback strategy. This dierent formula-
tion of the problem might be more appealing to nancial advisors of pension funds. In fact, a
model based on a loss function such as (11) can be immediately understood and accepted by
any pensioner, without entering the mathematical technicalities of the model.
3.3 Reducing the problem to a rectangle
Here we perform a change of variable in order to work with a simpler stochastic control problem.
The domain C will be transformed into a rectangle and our value function V will be related to the
value function H of this new control problem.
Let us consider the dieomorphism L : [0; T ] [S; F ]! C,
(t; z) 7 ! (t; x) = L(t; z) = (t;L1(t; z)) :=

t; ze r(T t) +
b0
r

1  e r(T t)

:
Remark 3.6. The relationship between x and z given by x = L1(t; z) is clear: z is the fund that one
would have at time T with the riskless strategy from t onwards. In other words, z = X(T ; t; x; 0):
In particular, F (t) = L1(t; F ) and S(t) = L1(t; S).
Let (t; x) 2 C and () 2 ad(t; x). By application of Ito's formula to the process
Z(s) = [L1(s; )] 1 (X(s; t; x; ())) ; s 2 [t; T ]; (12)
we see that Z solves (
dZ(s) = ~(s) [dt+ dB(s)] ; s 2 [t; T ];
Z(t) = z := [L1(t; )] 1(x);
(13)
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where ~(s) = er(T s)(s). For (t; z) 2 [0; T ] [S; F ] dene
~ad(t; z) :=

~()2L2(
 [t; T ];R) j ~() is prog. meas. w.r.t.Ft; S  Z(s; t; z; ~())  F; s 2 [t; T ]	:
Due to (12), we have ~ad(t; z) = ad(t;L1(t; z)).
Consider the objective functional
~J(t; z; ~()) := E
Z T
t
 (s)(F   Z(s))2ds+ (T )(F   Z(T ))2

; (14)
where
(s) := e s 2r(T s)
and Z() := Z(; t; z; ~()) follows the dynamics (13). Then consider the associated optimization
problem: for given (t; z) 2 [0; T ] [S; F ],
minimize ~J(t; z; ~()) over ~() 2 ~ad(t; z): (15)
As usual, dene the value function for this problem as
H(t; z) := inf
~()2~ad(t;z)
~J(t; z; ~()); (t; z) 2 [0; T ] [S; F ]: (16)
We can easily see that
H(t; z) = V (t;L1(t; z)): (17)
It follows that all the analysis which will be done for the problem (15) and for its associated value
function H can be suitably rephrased for the problem (7) and for its associated value function V .
Therefore, from now on within this section, we will study the problem (15) and the associated value
function H, which is simpler. The advantage is that the lateral boundaries are now
[0; T ) fSg; [0; T ) fFg:
They are absorbing for this new problem, in the sense that if z = S (respectively, z = F ), then the
only admissible strategy is ~()  0 and Z(s; t; S; 0) = S for all s 2 [t; T ] (respectively, Z(s; t; F; 0) =
F for all s 2 [t; T ]).
It can be shown that the value function H is convex, nonincreasing and continuous. In particular,
it has minimum at F . The proofs are standard and can be found in the extended version of the
paper [Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010].
Concerning the value of H at the lateral boundaries, as immediate consequence of the absorbing
property of the lateral boundaries we have
H(t; F ) = 0; 8t 2 [0; T ); (18)
H(t; S) =  (t) + (T )(F   S)2; 8t 2 [0; T ); (19)
where
 (t) =
Z T
t
 (s)(F   S)2ds: (20)
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3.4 The HJB equation
In this section we write down the HJB equation for the value function H. Despite the change of
variable of the previous subsection, the dierence between the dierential problem we are going to
set dening the HJB equation and the one studied in [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004] is that
the domain is smaller in space and suitable boundary conditions must be imposed. The presence
of boundary conditions is due to the state constraint that we are imposing here. As usual, the
presence of boundary conditions makes the HJB equation much more dicult to treat.
The current value Hamiltonian is
Hcv : R2  [0;+1)  ! R;
(p; P ; ~) 7 ! 122P ~2 + p~
and the Hamiltonian is
H : R2  ! R [ f 1g;
(p; P ) 7 ! inf
~0
Hcv(p; P ; ~):
Given (p; P ) 2 [0; T )  R  (0;+1), the function ~ 7! Hcv(p; P ; ~) has a unique minimum point
on [0;+1) given by
~(t; p; P ) =

  p
P

_ 0; (21)
hence in this case the Hamiltonian can be written as
H(p; P ) =
8<:  
2p2
2P
; if p < 0;
0; if p  0:
(22)
If P  0 the Hamiltonian is
H(p; P ) =
  1; if p < 0;
0; if p  0:
We recall that in the Hamiltonian, p is the formal argument where to insert Hz, and P is the formal
argument where to insert Hzz (if these derivatives exist). However, as mentioned, it can be proved
in standard way that the value function H is convex and nonincreasing. Therefore, only negative
values of p and positive values of P are consistent with Hz; Hzz. Nevertheless, we allow in principle
the formal arguments p; P of H to range in the whole R2.
The HJB equation (see e.g. [Yong & Zhou, 1999, Ch. 4]) reads as
ht(t; z) + (t)(F   z)2 +H(hz(t; z); hzz(t; z)) = 0; (t; z) 2 [0; T ) (S; F ): (23)
3.4.1 Passage to a dual equation
Now we associate a semilinear PDE to the fully nonlinear PDE (23), by means of a dual transforma-
tion of the state variable. This technique has been already used in the case of HJB equations coming
from optimal portfolio allocation problems (for which the nonlinearity in the second order term takes
the form v2x=vxx). We refer, e.g., to [Elie & Touzi, 2008] and [Schwartz & Tebaldi, 2006] in a lifetime
consumption and investment problem, to [Gao, 2008] and [Xiao , Zhai & Qin, 2007] in the accumu-
lation phase of a pension fund, to [Milevsky, Moore & Young, 2006], [Milevsky & Young, 2007] and
[Gerrard, Hjgaard & Vigna, 2012] in the decumulation phase of a pension fund. As mentioned in
13
Section 2, the passage to the dual problem is made necessary by the coexistence of S and F in the
same model, together with the quadratic loss function.
When  = 0, like in all the above quoted papers6 the resulting dual PDE is linear and we can
nd an explicit solution that will be presented in Subsection 3.5. In the general case  6= 0
the resulting dual PDE is just semilinear and we are not able to nd explicit solutions, so it
becomes necessary to study the regularity of its solutions. We perform this analysis in the extended
paper [Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010], while in the remainder of this section we limit
ourselves to show, in the general case   0, the formal connection between the original and the
dual problem.
Consider the following formal argument. For every (t; y) 2 [0; T ) (0;+1), take the function
[S; F ]! R+; z 7! H(t; z) + zy:
Assume that for each (t; y) 2 [0; T )(0;+1) such function has a unique minimizer g(t; y) 2 (S; F ).
Then, if H is C1 in the space variable, such minimizer is characterized by the relation
Hz(t; g(t; y)) =  y: (24)
We want to write an equation for g. To do that suppose that the value function H belongs to
C1;3([0; T )  (S; F );R). Then, by standard arguments (see [Yong & Zhou, 1999]), H is a solution
of the HJB equation (23). Dierentiating (23) we get
Htz(t; z) = 2 (t)(F   z) + 
2
2
2Hz(t; z)Hzz(t; z)
2  H2zHzzz(t; z)
Hzz(t; z)2
; (t; z) 2 [0; T ) (S; F ): (25)
Moreover, if g 2 C1;2([0; T ) (0;+1);R), dierentiating (24) with respect to t, with respect to y,
and twice with respect to y, we obtain
Htz(t; g(t; y)) +Hzz(t; g(t; y))gt(t; y) = 0; (26)
Hzz(t; g(t; y))gy(t; y) =  1; (27)
Hzzz(t; g(t; y))g
2
y(t; y) +Hzz(t; g(t; y))gyy(t; y) = 0: (28)
Plugging (26), (27), and (28) into (25) we get the following semilinear equation for g:
gt(t; y) + 
2ygy(t; y) +
2
2
y2gyy(t; y)  2(t)(F   g(t; y))gy(t; y) = 0; on [0; T ) (0;+1): (29)
A natural set of boundary conditions for g is to take Dirichlet conditions at the space state boundary
and a terminal condition at time T . Concerning the terminal boundary condition, it is easy to nd
it using the terminal boundary condition for H. Indeed by (24) it has to be
g(T; y) =

F   y
2(T )

_ S:
Concerning the Dirichlet boundary conditions, it follows from (24) that they have to be related to
Dirichlet boundary conditions on Hz. Such conditions are the following:
7
(i) Hz(t; F ) = 0; (ii) lim
z#S
Hz(t; z) =  1; 8t 2 [0; T ): (30)
6Apart from [Schwartz & Tebaldi, 2006] where the dual equation is still fully nonlinear.
7Concerning these conditions we notice that the rst one can be proved directly (see
[Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010]), while the second one is more dicult to prove, but it has the
following intuition behind. The marginal loss when the fund approaches the safety level is huge. This is clear if one
thinks to the main idea of this paper. The retiree takes the income drawdown option in order to be better o than
immediate annuitization, and therefore she aims at reaching the target. Her worst scenario is (and has to be) falling
into the safety level.
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If
Hzz(t; ) > 0; (31)
then Hz(t; ) is invertible and the latter boundary conditions on Hz imply the following ones for g:
(i) g(t; F ) = 0; (ii) lim
y!+1 g(t; y) = S: (32)
All these arguments can be made rigorous ending up with the following proposition.
Proposition 3.7. Suppose that the value function H belongs to the class C1;3([0; T ) (S; F );R),
that it satises (30)-(31). Let g be dened by (24). Then g 2 C1;2([0; T ) (0;+1);R) and it is a
solution of (29)-(32).
The converse passage, i.e. the passage from a solution g of (29)-(32) to a solution
h of (23)-(30) is much more technical and is proven in the general case   0 in
[Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010]. However, when explicit solutions are available for
(29)-(32), the proof becomes easier. This happens in the special case  = 0, as it is shown in the
next subsection.
3.5 Solution in the case with no running cost
It is very hard { maybe impossible { to nd explicit solutions to (29)-(32) when  6= 0. In this
paper, we treat only the case  = 0, while the general case  6= 0 { that needs the viscosity
approach and a remarkably more technical analysis as well as non-standard results { is treated
in the extended paper [Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010]. Notice that, in this context,
the case  6= 0 is mainly interesting from the mathematical point of view. Indeed, we observe
that the main assumption of this paper is that the retiree enters retirement at time t = 0 and
takes the income drawdown option until compulsory annuitization at time t = T , with no action
in the intervening period. Therefore, the desire of closeness to a target fund over time, although
perfectly reasonable, does not seem to be strictly necessary and can be dropped without rendering
the problem unrealistic or less interesting.
On the other hand, we notice that nding optimal strategies that avoid ruin a priori is of great
interest in itself, given that a substantial stream of literature addresses the relevant issue of
avoiding ruin or minimizing its probability in income drawdown problems. See, among others,
[Albrecht & Maurer, 2002], [Gerrard, Hjgaard & Vigna, 2012], [Milevsky, Moore & Young, 2006],
and [Milevsky & Robinson, 2000]. In these papers the exibility of choosing a guaranteed nal fund
S > 0 and the guarantee of a positive income b0 from retirement to nal annuitization { that is the
motivation of this paper { are missing. Indeed, up to our knowledge, this is the rst model in the
literature on income drawdown option that allows the pensioner to choose a minimum guaranteed
level of wealth at the time T of ultimate annuitization, while guaranteeing a xed consumption
rate up to time T .
So, let  = 0. In this case (29) becomes
gt(t; y) + 
2ygy(t; y) +
2
2
y2gyy(t; y) = 0; on [0; T ) (0;+1) (33)
with boundary conditions (32). This is a linear PDE of Black-Scholes type and, as known, its
(classical) solution admits the Kolmogorov probabilistic representation
g(t; y) = E [g(T; Y (T ; t; y))] ; (t; y) 2 [0; T ] [0;+1);
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where Y (; t; y) is the solution of(
dY (s) = 2Y (s)ds+ Y (s)dB(s); s 2 [t; T ];
Y (t) = y;
(34)
Since the law of Y (T ; t; y) is known (it is the log-normal law), we can explicitly compute g. Indeed,
the unique classical solution of (33) with boundary conditions (32) is the function8><>:
g(t; y)=(F S)(k(t; y))  y
2(T )
e
2(T t)(k(t; y) pT t)+S; (t; y)2 [0; T )[0;+1);
g(T; y)=

F   y
2(T )

_ S;
(35)
where
k(t; y) =
  log

y
2(T )(F   S)

  
2
2
(T   t)

p
T   t
and where  is the cumulative distribution function of a standard Gaussian random variable,
i.e. (x) = 1p
2
R x
 1 e
  2
2 d: Having at disposal the closed-form solution for g(t; y), we can now
complete Proposition 3.7 and prove the second half of the equivalence between the original problem
and the dual one.
Proposition 3.8. Let g be dened by (35). Then
[g(t; )] 1 is integrable at S+; 8t 2 [0; T ): (36)
Moreover let8<:h(t; z) = (T )(F   S)2  
Z z
S
[g(t; )] 1()d; (t; z) 2 [0; T ) [S; F ];
h(T; z) = (T )(F   z)2; z 2 [S; F ]:
(37)
Then h is a classical solution of (23)-(30) with  = 0.
Proof. It follows by direct computations. It can be seen also as a particular case of Proposition
4.18 of [Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010]. 
Proposition 3.8 provides a function h which is a good candidate to be the value function H. We
are going to show that it is actually the value function through a verication theorem and use it to
construct optimal feedback strategies for the problem. First we associate to the function h provided
by Proposition 3.8 a feedback map which formally describes the optimal strategy in feedback form.
Due to (21) this map is
G(t; z) :=
8<:  


hz(t; z)
hzz(t; z)
; (t; z) 2 [0; T ) (S; F );
0; (t; z) 2 [0; T ) fS; Fg;
(38)
where h is dened in (37). It is more convenient to rewrite it in terms of the solution g provided
by (35). Using (26), (27), and (28), it reads as
G(t; z) =  

[g(t; )] 1(z) gy

t; [g(t; )] 1(z)

; on [0; T ) (S; F ):
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Then, taking into account the explicit expression (35), we see that G is continuous and bounded
on [0; T ) [S; F ]. It can also be shown (see [Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010]) that the
map G dened in (38) is not Lipschitz continuous with respect to z, but is -Holder continuous
with respect to z uniformly in t 2 [0; t0] for every t0 2 [0; T ) and  2 (0; 1). This result would be
suitable to study directly the closed loop equation, proving existence and uniqueness of a strong
solution.8 However, here we follow a dierent approach, and prove existence and uniqueness of
a strong solution by means of the process Y ;t;y 1 = (Y t;y) 1; this process will play a role on
the interpretation of the optimal wealth in Remark 3.12. Let y := [[g(t; )] 1(z)] 1, i.e. y 1 :=
[g(t; )] 1(z). Then Y ;t;y 1 solves(
dY ;t;y 1(s) =  Y ;t;y 1(s)dB(s); s 2 [t; T ];
Y ;t;y 1(t) = [g(t; )] 1(z): (39)
Consider the process
Z(s; t; z) := g
 
s; Y ;t;y
 1
(s)

; y 1 := [g(t; )] 1(z): (40)
We notice that by denition of Z(; t; z), since Y ;t;z(s) > 0 and g(t; ) 2 (S; F ) on (0;+1) for
every t 2 [0; T ), we have
Z(s; t; z) 2 (S; F ); 8s 2 [t; T ]: (41)
Ito's formula and the fact that g solves (33) yield that Z(; t; z) solves the closed loop equation
associated with the map G, i.e.(
dZ(s) = G(s; Z(s)) [ds+ dB(s)] ; s 2 [t; T ];
Z(t) = z 2 (S; F ); (42)
on the interval [t; T ]. Furthermore, equation (42) admits the solution Z()  F (respectively,
Z()  S) if z = F (respectively, if z = S). So we also set Z(; t; S)  S and Z(; t; F )  F . Then
dene the feedback strategy
~t;z(s) =

G(s; Z(s; t; z)); s 2 [t; T ):
0; s = T;
(43)
Of course ~t;z(s) 2 L2(
 [t; T ]) as G is bounded. Moreover
Z(s) = Z(s; t; z; ~t;z()): (44)
Indeed, both Z(; t; z; ~t;z()) and Z(; t; z) solve the state equation under the control ~t;z(). There-
fore we conclude that ~t;z() is admissible. We now show that it is indeed the unique optimal
strategy starting from (t; z). To prove the uniqueness, rst we need to prove that the functional
(14) is strictly convex on ~ad(t; z). This is the result of the following proposition.
Proposition 3.9. Let (t; z) 2 [0; T )[S; F ]. Then the functional ~ad(t; z)! R, ~() 7! ~J(t; z; ~())
is strictly convex.
Proof. Let (t; z) 2 [0; T )  [S; F ] and take ~1(); ~2() 2 ~ad(t; z). Further, for  2 (0; 1) let
~() := ~1() + (1   )~2(). Dening Z1() := Z(; t; z; ~1()), Z2() := Z(; t; z; ~2()), and
8In this case, we would use the theory treated in [Yamada & Watanabe, 1971] to prove pathwise uniqueness and
then existence of strong solutions. For a similar approach see, e.g., [Di Giacinto, Federico & Gozzi, 2011].
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Z() = Z1() + (1  )Z2() we see that Z() := Z(; t; z; ~()). Therefore, due to the convexity
of z 7! (F   z)2 we have
~J(t; z; ~()) = E

(F   Z(T ))2
  E (F   Z1(T ))2+ (1  )E (F   Z2(T ))2
=  ~J(t; z; ~1()) + (1  ) ~J(t; z; ~2()):
Moreover, by linearity of the state equation we have Z1 6= Z2 when ~1 6= ~2 and by the strict
convexity of z 7! (F   z)2 the above inequality is strict; so the claim is proved. 
Theorem 3.10. Let h be the function dened in (37). Then h = H and for each (t; z) 2 [0; T )
[S; F ] the strategy ~t;z() dened by (43) is the unique optimal strategy for the problem (15) with
 = 0.
Proof. We distinguish the two cases
(i) (t; z) 2 [0; T ) (S; F );
(ii) (t; z) 2 [0; T ) fS; Fg.
In case (ii) the only admissible strategy is the null one and the claim is trivial.
Let us consider case (i). Given an admissible strategy ~() 2 ~ad(t; z) and using the fact that h
solves (33) we can show by standard verication arguments that
~J (t; z;())  h(t; z):
On the other hand consider ~t;z(). As we have observed ~t;z() is admissible. Moreover (41) ensures
that Z(; t; z; ~t;z()) 2 (S; F ). Then the fact that h is a classical solution of the HJB equation (23)
on [0; T ) (S; F ) yields (again by standard verication arguments)
~J(t; z; ~()) = h(t; z):
Therefore as a byproduct we can conclude that h(t; z) = H(t; z) and that ~s;z() is optimal.
The uniqueness of this optimal strategy follows from the strict convexity of ~J(t; z; ) proved in
Proposition 3.9. 
Remark 3.11. The uniqueness of the optimal strategy yields uniqueness of solution for the closed
loop equation (42). Indeed, suppose to have another solution ~Z of the closed loop equation. Applying
the Dynamic Programming Principle with the stopping time
 := inf
n
s 2 [t; T ] j ~Z(s) 2 fS; Fg
o
(with the agreement that inf ; = T ), and using the fact that H is a smooth solution of the HJB
equation (23) in [0; T ) (S; F ), we can see that the strategy
~t;z(s) =

G(s; ~Z(s)); s 2 [t; );
0; s  ;
is optimal for the problem. By uniqueness of optimal strategies (Proposition 3.9) it must be ~t;z =
t;z. Moreover we can see that G is monotone in z. Hence we have also ~Z = Z, where Z is
dened in (40).
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Remark 3.12. By a dierent approach, we have obtained the same result as in [Tepla, 2001].
Indeed, let us look at the optimization problem we have dened in Subsection 3.3.9 Consider the
denition of the optimal wealth Z we have given in (40) for initial data (0; z0) and the risk neutral
probability measure Q, the process BQ(t) = t+B(t) is a Brownian motion, therefore, due to (42),
the process Z is a Q-martingale. So, setting Y  = Y ;0;y 1, with y 1 = [g(0; )] 1(z0), we have
Z(t) = EQ [Z(T ) j Ft] = EQ [g(T; Y (T )) j Ft] = S + EQ [g(T; Y (T ))  S j Ft] :
Hence, the value of the optimal wealth at time t is equal to the minimum guarantee S plus
the value of an option with underlying Y  and with payo function g(T; y)   S. This is in-
deed the same result obtained in [Tepla, 2001]. We observe also that there is also an insur-
ance interpretation to the solution found, as mentioned in [Tepla, 2001] and widely described
in [El Karoui, Jeanblanc & Lacoste, 2005]: it is the so called Option Based Portfolio Insurance
method introduced by [Leland & Rubinstein, 1976].
4 Numerical application
In this section we show a numerical application of the model presented so far using a MATLAB
code. We consider the position of a male retiree aged 60 with initial wealth x0 = 100. Consistently
with [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004], we set T = 15. The market parameters are r = 0:03;  =
0:08;  = 0:15, implying a Sharpe ratio equal to  = 0:33. The amount withdrawn in the unit time,
b0, is set equal to the pension rate purchasable at retirement, using Italian projected mortality
tables (RG48). Thus, we set b0 = 6:22. This choice is consistent with previous literature on the
topic.
The choice of the nal target F and the nal guarantee S are evidently subjective and depend
on the member's risk aversion. High risk aversion will lead to a high guarantee and a low level of
the target, while a high target and a low guarantee will be driven by low risk aversion. We have
tested three levels of risk aversion. Thus, high risk aversion is associated to terminal safety level
S = 23b0a75 and nal target equal to F = 1:5b0a75, where a75 is the actuarial value of a unitary
lifetime annuity issued to an individual aged 75; medium risk aversion is associated to terminal
safety level S = 12b0a75 and nal target equal to F = 1:75b0a75; low risk aversion is associated to
terminal safety level equal to S = 0 and nal target equal to F = 2b0a75. These values are reported
in Table 1 below.
S F
High risk aversion 23b0a75 1:5b0a75
Medium risk aversion 12b0a75 1:75b0a75
Low risk aversion 0 2b0a75
Table 1: Terminal safety level S and nal target F for dierent risk proles.
The interpretation of these choices is immediate. With high and medium risk aversion, the minimum
pension rate guaranteed is, respectively, two third and half of the annuity rate that was possible
9In this case, the interest rate has been removed - as well as the benet streaming b0dt - so we are in presence of a
market composed by a riskless asset with vanishing return rate and a risky asset with volatility  and risk premium
. We consider this problem in place of the original one just for convenience.
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to have on immediate annuitization at retirement, b0a75; the targeted wealth is sucient to fund
a nal pension that amounts to, respectively, 1.5 and 1.75 of b0. With low risk aversion, ruin is
always avoided but in the worst scenario no money is left for annuitization at age 75; on the other
hand, the targeted pension pursued is twice b0.
Remark 4.1. It is worth mentioning that even the most risk averse individual has some restrictions
in choosing the minimum income guaranteed. Indeed, from the formulation of the problem (see
restriction (9) on S) we have that the value of S has to satisfy S  z0 = x0erT   b0r (erT   1).
The most risk averse choice would be S = z0, but in this case the only admissible strategy would be
()  0, i.e. the whole fund wealth must be invested in the riskless asset (see Proposition (3.1)), and
one would end up after 15 years with an annuity lower than that purchasable at retirement.10 This
choice makes little sense in a realistic framework, given that here the bequest motive is disregarded
and the individual takes the income drawdown option only in the hope of being able to buy a better
annuity than b0. For this reason, we here consider only cases where S < z0, which in this particular
example translates into S < 23b0 a75.
We have carried out 1000 Monte Carlo simulations for the behaviour of the risky asset, with
discretization step equal to one week. In order to do so, we have simulated the process Y  given
by equation (39) with starting point
Y (0) = [g(0; )] 1(z0)
and inserting the corresponding values of S, F and z0 as above. With each risk aversion we have
generated the same 1000 scenarios, by applying in each case the same stream of pseudo random
numbers.
For each risk aversion choice, we report the following results:
 Evolution of the fund under optimal control during the 15 years time, by showing a graph
with mean and standard deviation and a graph with some percentiles.
 Behaviour of the optimal investment strategy over the 15 years time, by showing a graph
with some percentiles. Notice that we report the optimal share of portfolio invested in the
risky asset ()=X(), rather than the optimal amount (). This is standard, and is done
in order to facilitate comparisons between dierent situations.
 Distribution of the nal annuity that can be bought with the nal fund at age 75 and com-
parison with the annuity purchasable at retirement. The conversion of the nal fund into
annuity has been done with the same basis as above.
Figures 1{4 report results for high risk aversion, Figures 5{8 those for medium risk aversion, Figures
9{12 those for low risk aversion. In particular, Figures 1, 5, and 9 report, over 15 years time, the
mean and dispersion of the fund trajectories, while Figures 2, 6, and 10 report their percentiles.
Figures 3, 7, and 11 report some percentiles of the distribution of the optimal investment allocation
()=X() over 15 years. Finally, Figures 4, 8, and 12 report the distribution of the nal annuity
upon annuitization at time T .
10This is clear, considering that the investment in an insurance product benets from mortality credits, that
enhance the riskless rate.
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Figure 1: High risk aversion.
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Figure 2: High risk aversion.
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Figure 3: High risk aversion.
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Figure 4: High risk aversion.
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Figure 5: Medium risk aversion.
0 5 10 15
0
50
100
150
TIME
W
EA
LT
H
 A
M
O
UN
T
OPTIMAL WEALTH AMOUNT
F(t)             
S(t)             
min              
max              
5° perc.         
25° perc.        
50° perc.        
75° perc.        
95° perc.        
b0× a75
Figure 6: Medium risk aversion.
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Figure 7: Medium risk aversion.
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Figure 8: Medium risk aversion.
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Figure 9: Low risk aversion.
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Figure 10: Low risk aversion.
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Figure 11: Low risk aversion.
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Figure 12: Low risk aversion.
From the graphs we can make the following comments:
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 The wealth trajectories lie strictly between the two barriers S(t) and F (t) for t < T . In fact,
due to (40) and (41), the two bottom and upper absorbing barriers cannot be reached before
time T . 11
 Due to our choice of S and F , when the risk aversion decreases, the boundaries for the
wealth process become larger. Also the simulated wealth process results to be more spread
out around the mean. This is due to the intuitive fact that the optimal strategies are more
aggressive (see next item) and the range of nal outcomes increases, both in the positive and
in the negative direction.
 Inspection of Figures 3, 7, and 11 shows that when the risk aversion decreases, the optimal
strategies become riskier. In fact, with high risk aversion the 95th percentile of the optimal
investment allocation ()=X() stays below 2 even immediately prior to time T , whereas
with low risk aversion it lies between 5 and 6 close to T . On the other hand, clearly, all
strategies are bounded away from 0.
 Comparing Figures 4, 8, and 12 it is immediate to see that the distribution of the nal
annuity becomes more and more spread when the risk aversion decreases. Moreover, with
high risk aversion one can observe a considerable concentration around the guaranteed income
2
3b0 = 4:15. In fact, in almost 50% of the cases, the fund approaches S(t) and stays close to
it until T (this can be noticed also by thorough inspection of Figure 2). On the contrary, the
distribution of nal annuity looks very favourable in the case of low risk aversion, where in
most of the cases the annuity lies between 9 and 12, and unfavourable scenarios leading to
nal income equal to 0 happen in about 5% of the cases.
 We observe that the standard deviation of the investment allocation increases over time,
especially towards time T . This can be observed in Figures 3, 7, and 11. The optimal share
of portfolio becomes very variable in the 2-3 years before time T . This feature makes this
case substantially dierent from the (state) unconstrained one, where the higher variability
of the investment strategy is experienced in the rst years after retirement. This interesting
dierence is evidently due to the inclusion of the absorbing lower barrier S(t). The explanation
can be the following: when time T approaches the risk of collapsing onto the safety level
reduces remarkably, and many pensioners may be willing to take more risk than in previous
years when the risk of locking their position into the safety level is more important.
One should not forget that the real goal of the pensioner who opts for phased withdrawals is to
be better o than immediate annuitization when nal annuitization takes place. Thus, it is of
greatest interest to provide her with detailed information regarding the distribution of the nal
annuity achieved. The importance of full information to the pension fund member is noted also
by [Looney & Hardin, 2009], who nd that retirement portfolio of occupational pension funds are
overly conservative, and that conservatism diminishes when the investor is provided prospective
probabilities and payos over long time horizons. To some extent, information on annuity distri-
bution has been already provided in Figures 4, 8, and 12. However, the histograms cannot report
relevant information that are of immediate use for the member who has to choose a risk prole. In
particular, for the member's decision making the comparison between the nal annuity achievable
11Looking at the graphs reporting the percentiles of the trajectories, however, it seems that in some cases the fund
touches the bottom target S(t). This is due to the approximation error made by the machine, that is unavoidable.
In fact, for not too low values of x, (x) is so close to 0 that it cannot be distinguished from it. The result is that
in the practical applications for not too high values of y one has  (k(t; y)) = 
 
k (t; y)  pT   t = 0. This
implies g(t; y) = S, meaning that the fund is on the safety level S(t), which is theoretically impossible.
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by taking income drawdown option and b0 (the pension rate purchasable at retirement) is relevant.
Table 2 reports useful statistics of the distribution of the nal annuity achieved at age 75, for each
risk aversion. The rst nine lines report mean, standard deviation, min, max and some percentiles
of the distribution of the nal annuity. Lines 10 and 11 report, respectively, the guaranteed in-
come S=a75 and the targeted income F=a75 (as chosen in Table 1), while the last line reports the
probability (i.e. the frequency over 1000 scenarios) that the nal annuity is higher than b0.
high medium low
risk aversion risk aversion risk aversion
mean 5.70 7.44 9.40
st.dev. 1.74 2.73 3.38
min 4.15 3.11 0.00
5th perc. 4.15 3.11 0.00
25th perc. 4.15 4.87 8.45
50th perc. 4.75 8.41 10.80
75th perc. 7.33 9.80 11.72
95th perc. 8.71 10.55 12.21
max 9.29 10.86 12.42
guaranteed income S=a75 4.15 3.11 0
targeted income F=a75 9.33 10.89 12.44
prob(nal annuity > b0) 39:20% 68:80% 84:10%
Table 2: Distribution of nal annuity at age 75 when the annuity on immediate annuitization is
b0 = 6:22.
The following comments can be made:12
 The mean of the nal annuity is 5.70, 7.44, 9.40 with high, medium and low risk aversion,
respectively. The probability of being able to aord a nal annuity higher than b0 = 6:22 is
39:20%, 68:80% and 84:10% with high, medium and low risk aversion, respectively.
 This shows that if the risk aversion is too high,13 the price for having a high guarantee on the
nal income is that the chances of reaching the desired annuity reduce dramatically. In fact,
in 60% of the cases the individual ends up with a nal annuity lower than b0 and, even worse,
in almost 50% of the cases the individual receives exactly the guaranteed income, that is only
two third of b0. This is likely to be an undesirable result for the pensioner and it seems to
indicate that if the member's risk aversion is too high, it is not convenient to take the income
drawdown option. This feature was already observed by [Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2006].
12Notice that, due to the approximation error made by the machine (see previous footnote) the values indicated
by the minimum and by the rst low percentiles coincide with the guaranteed income.
13Observe, in fact, that the value of S = 0:67 b0 a75 is chosen to be very close to the upper boundary z0 = 0:70 b0 a75.
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 On the other hand, with medium and low risk aversion the chances of being better o with
annuitization at time T are almost 70% and 85%, respectively. This is an encouraging result,
given that from retirement to T the pensioner has withdrawn the prescribed rate of b0 and
that she was also guaranteed with a minimum lifetime income at retirement, or at worst
against ruin.
 The low risk aversion prole could turn out to be particularly attractive to a member whose
global post-retirement income is not heavily aected by the second pillar provision. In fact:
{ the chances of exceeding the immediate annuitization income b0 are extremely high
(84%);
{ in 750 cases out of 1000 the member ends up with an annuity higher than 8.45, that is
well above b0 = 6:22;
{ in about 50 cases out of 1000 the nal annuity is null (see also Figure 12);
{ ruin never occurs.
 Clearly, the price to pay for having a favourable distribution of nal income is to take more
risk, which translates into more aggressive investment policies. This is highlighted by Fig.11,
that reports the optimal investment strategies for low risk aversion. In more than 25% of
the cases, the optimal strategy consists in borrowing considerable amounts of money to be
invested in the risky asset. This kind of strategy is evidently not feasible in the presence of
real world constraints. Hence, the importance and the need of approaching the problem with
a no-borrowing constraint in future research.
5 Conclusions and further research
In this paper we have considered the investment allocation problem for a member of a DC pen-
sion scheme in the decumulation phase. We have extended the basic unconstrained model of
[Gerrard, Haberman & Vigna, 2004] by introducing a no short-selling constraint and a nal capital
requirement. It turns out that the wealth process must lie between two barriers: the bottom one
representing a natural safety level for the fund, and the upper one representing a sort of target
to be pursued. In particular, the presence of the bottom safety level implies that the undesirable
event of ruin is avoided. The problem has been formulated in general through the dynamic pro-
gramming approach and the associated HJB equation. We have transformed the original problem
into a dual one and have shown equivalence between the two problems. In the special but relevant
case without running cost, we have solved the dual problem, nding closed-form solution for the
value function and the optimal strategy. A numerical application shows the impact of the model
on retiree's choices.
Some remarks on the practical relevance of our analysis are the following. To the best of our
knowledge this is the rst model in the literature on this topic that allows the pensioner to choose
a minimum guaranteed level of wealth at the time of ultimate annuitization. The introduction
of a minimum guaranteed wealth in the income drawdown scheme should further encourage the
selection of this option by retirees. The model is quite exible for it allows for subjective choices
regarding both the safety and the target levels. These choices are typically driven by the needs and
the risk prole of the pensioner. In particular, the less risk-averse pensioner can aim to a high target
such as double the annuity, while still keeping the guarantee of avoiding ruin; the most risk-averse
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individual can aim to a lower target, while still guaranteeing a minimum income level upon nal
annuitization. Moreover, the availability of closed-form expressions for the optimal policy makes
the model quite useful for practical purposes. Indeed, supported by encouraging results of the
numerical application performed, we think that this model can provide a number of information
useful for the setup of a decision-making tool in the decumulation phase of a DC pension plan.
Due to the diculty of the task, we have not analyzed the more important problem of short-selling
and borrowing constraints plus nal capital requirement and the case when the investor can choose
the consumption rate and the annuitization date. This problem could be tackled at theoretical level
with the viscosity approach coupled with the dual transformation { similarly to what done in the
extended paper [Di Giacinto, Federico, Gozzi, & Vigna, 2010]. The search for explicit solutions, at
least in some special case, seems to be very challenging and is in the agenda for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. (1) Clearly, if 0 2 0ad(t; x), then 0ad(t; x) 6= ;. Conversely, suppose that 0ad(t; x) 6=
; and let () 2 0ad(t; x). This means that X(T ; t; x; ())  S almost surely; therefore
~E[X(T ; t; x; ())]  S, where ~E denotes the expectation under the probability ~P = e B(T ) 
2
2
T P
given by the Girsanov transformation. Writing the dynamics of X(; t; x; ()) under ~P and taking
the expectations under ~E, we see that
X(T ; t; x; 0) = ~E[X(T ; t; x; ()]  S;
hence 0 2 0ad(t; x). This proves the rst part of the claim.
For the second part, notice that the state equation yields
X(s; t; x; 0) =
b0
r
 

b0
r
  x

er(s t);
so that from the expression of S() in (8) we obtain the claim.
(2) If x = S(t), by the state equation and (8)) we have X(s; t; x; 0) = S(s) on [t; T ]; therefore
0 2 0ad(t; x). On the other hand, take a strategy () 2 0ad(t; x) and let X() := X(; t; x; ()).
Arguing as before, one can see that in this case
S = X(T ; t; x; 0) = ~E[X(T )]  S:
Since () is admissible, we have X(T )  S. Thus, it must be X(T )  S under P . Therefore
Var[X(T )] = 0; under P  ~P; (45)
where ~P is the probability measure given by the Girsanov transformation described in part (1).
We claim that this happens if and only if ()  0. Let us consider the system under ~P . As shown
we have
~E[X(s)] = X(s; t; x; 0) =
b0
r
 

b0
r
  x

er(s t): (46)
Applying Ito's formula to X() with the square function under ~P we get
d(X(s))2 = 2X(s)
h
[rX(s)  b0]ds+ (s)d ~B(s)
i
+ 2(s)2ds: (47)
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We want to take the expectations in (47), getting rid of the stochastic integral. This can be done
with a localization argument. So we get, passing (47) to the expectations,
~E

X(T )2

= x2e2r(T t)  
Z T
t
e2r(T u)2b0~E[X(u)]du+
Z T
t
e2r(T u)2~E

2(u)

du: (48)
Using (45), (46), and (48), straightforward computations yieldZ T
t
e2r(T u)2~E

2(u)

du = 0;
which proves what we have claimed.
(3) This is obvious, given the previous item.
(4) Let x > S(t). Dene the strategy
 (s) :=

1; if s 2 [t;  ];
0; if s 2 [; T ];
where
 := inf fs 2 [t; T ] j X(s; t; x; 1) = S(s)g :
Then, by the previous item,  () 2 0ad(t; x). Moreover, since x > S(t), we have  > t. Therefore
() is not identically null, so the claim.
(5) The claim reduces to show that, for every () 2 0ad(t; x), we have X(s)  S(s) almost surely
for any s 2 [t; T ]. This follows by items (2) and (3). 
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